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Finessing the Bored
Monkey Problem
Ned Block1,*By recording from microelectrodes in
monkey prefrontal cortex (PFC), re-
searchers have decoded the contents of
conscious perception in cognitive areas
(lateral prefrontal cortex) in conditions in
which perceptions are not determined by
the stimulus, binocular rivalry, and ﬂash
suppression [1–4]. As I noted in my recent
Trends in Cognitive Sciences article [5],
such results cannot be taken to support
cognitive theories of consciousness be-
cause of the ‘bored monkey problem’:
the idea that subjects whose only task is
ﬁxating a dot may have thoughts about
the noticeably different stimuli, causing
prefrontal differences that do not reﬂect
prefrontal consciousness. This was the
negative point of my article, and in their
commentary Phillips and Morales (P&M)
[6] do not dispute it.
What they do dispute is my positive point:
that Brascamp et al. [7] have evaded
the bored monkey problem. One innova-
tion introduced by Brascamp et al. is to
use stimuli that have two related useful
properties. The ﬁrst is that the stimuli do
not afford any ready-to-hand cognitive cat-
egories for characterizing them other than
as moving dots. Subjects cannot say
to themselves: ‘There is the face again.’
P&M say ‘Nothing in Brascamp et al.'s
methodology prevents observers engaging
in extensive cognitive processing’, both in
the rivalry transitions and the similar real
(objective) transitions. However, P&M are
neglecting the fact that the stimuli do not
naturally draw cognitive processing
in either the rivalry case or the real case.
P&M focus on the distinguishability of the
rivalrous transitions from the nonrivalrous
real (objective) transitions, emphasizingreplay subtraction. However, the aforemen-
tioned monkey experiments [1–4] do not
use any form of replay subtraction. This re-
search does involve comparisons between
perception of the rivalrous stimuli and per-
ception of real stimuli, but the purpose is to
ascertainwhich neurons respond to the per-
cept rather than to the stimulus.
The second useful property of these
stimuli is that they are subjectively different
from each other without being con-
spicuously different. P&M [6] say: ‘Yet
indiscriminable stimuli look the same.’
However, although the stimuli are not
noticeably different, they are subjectively
different: they differ from each other in the
directions of movement of each dot and
in the overall directions of motion of the
dots. Indeed, they are sufﬁciently subjec-
tively different to trigger conscious rivalry.
I mentioned [5] that rivalry occurs in fruit
ﬂies and can occur in unconscious per-
ception. P&M conclude that the rivalry
in Brascamp et al. might be invisible.
However, one cannot generalize in this
way from rivalry when subjects do not
consciously see the stimuli. Rivalry in-
volves the dominance of one whole neural
coalition over another. I know of no evi-
dence that rivalry in the case of con-
sciously seen stimuli can somehow slice
off the conscious part of the coalition. The
competing stimuli are subjectively but not
noticeably different. Not being noticeably
different, rivalry transitions are less likely to
draw more attention than real transitions –
as conﬁrmed by Brascamp et al.
Would the differences between the neu-
ral representations of such stimuli be
decodable in the brain at all given how sim-
ilar they are? Recall that the explanation of
binocular rivalry is that pools of neurons
that represent each of the stimuli are mutu-
ally inhibitory. In the presence of neural
noise, one pool wins out. The dominant
pool of neurons then weakens due to ad-
aptation, the other pool taking over in theTrwinner-takes-all process of perception,
then the cycle repeats. If this weakening
and strengthening of content representa-
tions were happening in PFC, it would be
detectable, either with fMRI or with electro-
physiological methods (microelectrodes
inserted into the cortex). Not ﬁnding differ-
ences between the rivalrous changes and
the real changes is evidence against PFC
differences and hence against cognitive
theories of conscious contents.
This point interacts with the issue of the
not-noticeably different stimuli. With read-
ily characterizable (e.g., face/house) stim-
uli, weakening and strengthening in visual
cortex could have caused a cognitive
reﬂection of that weakening and strength-
ening in PFC, misleading us as to the role
of consciousness in PFC.
Returning to the comparison of the rival-
rous transitions with the nonrivalrous real
transitions, P&M concede that failure to
ﬁnd PFC differences between rivalrous
and real transitions shows that the causes
of rivalrous transitions are not to be found
in PFC. However, they go on to say that
the conscious contents may nonetheless
be in PFC. They use this point to conclude
that methodologies that compare real with
rivalrous transitions – including subtracting
replay from rivalry – ‘cannot discriminate
rival hypotheses concerning NCC's’
(neural correlate of consciousness).
Note that the neural bases of transitions
and contents are linked. In particular, if
perceptual contents are based in PFC,
the strengthening and weakening of
content representations that are intrinsic
to binocular rivalry would make rivalrous
transitions neurally different from real
transitions, as noted above. Contents
and differences in content have conse-
quences for transitions. So, failure to ﬁnd
differences between rivalrous transitions
and real transitions in cognitive areas
of PFC disconﬁrms cognitive theories of
conscious contents.ends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2020, Vol. xx, No. xx 1
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